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Abstract 
This study explores the regulatory setting in Taiwan and examines the association between 
academic directors and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting. We find that firms with 
academic directors on the board are more likely to issue a stand-alone CSR report and obtain 
third-party assurance on their CSR reports. We also find a positive association between CSR 
reporting and academic directors with industry expertise. Further cross-sectional analyses 
indicate that the positive relation between academic directors (and their industry expertise) and 
CSR reporting is stronger in firms with higher growth, greater institutional ownership, and 
larger control-ownership divergence. Our findings that the presence of academic directors can 
promote better sustainability reporting suggest that academic directors contribute not only to 
shareholder value but also to wider stakeholder interests.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate boards play an important role in advising and monitoring managerial 
behavior. Recent trends in U.S. corporate board composition suggest an increase in the 
appointment of directors from academia. According to Francis, Hasan, and Wu (2015), from 
1998 to 2011 approximately 40% of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1,500 firms have at least one 
professor in their boardroom and roughly 14.3% of these firms’ outside directors are drawn 
from academia. The proportion of academics on board is especially increasing after the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, due to the more stringent requirement on 
board independence and expertise (Linck, Netter, and Yang 2008).  
We explore the regulatory setting in Taiwan and examine the association between 
independent directors’ academic expertise and firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
reporting. In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and major stock 
exchanges only require outside directors to be independent (i.e., do not have any relationships 
with the firm) but do not regulate directors’ qualifications. In contrast, the Securities 
Exchange Act in Taiwan explicitly specifies academic experience as one of the qualifications 
for independent directors. In our sample of listed firms with independent directors on the 
board, academics account for 40%.1 Thus it appears that academia is a popular source for 
Taiwanese firms to appoint independent directors.2  
Many studies show that the presence of academic directors on board is positively related 
to firm performance. For example, using the setting of academic director appointments, 
                                                     
1 According to the independence criterion, all academics on the board are “independent directors” that do not 
have any affiliations with the firm other than serving as a director on the board.  
2 As a comparison, Pang et al. (2018) show that the largest category of independent directors in China are 
university professors or academic researchers, with academics accounting for 35% of all independent directors.  
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White et al. (2014) find that the market reacts favorably to appointments of professors with 
specialized expertise (e.g., medicine, science, and engineering) and administrative academics 
affiliated with a business school. Similarly, Francis, Hasan, and Wu (2015) also find that 
companies with directors from academia are associated with higher financial performance 
(measured by return on assets and Tobin’s Q) and better corporate governance (including 
lower CEO compensation, higher earnings quality, and higher CEO forced turnover-
performance sensitivity). More recently, Chen et al. (2019) and Pang et al. (2018) utilize the 
regulatory setting in China and document a negative market reaction to academic director 
resignations, supporting academic directors’ positive contribution to firm value. We extend 
this stream of literature by focusing on the role of academic directors in influencing firms’ 
CSR disclosures.3  
CSR is corporate social or environmental behavior that goes beyond the legal or 
regulatory requirements faced by the company (Kitzmueller and Shimshack 2012). Over the 
last several decades, CSR activities have become an increasingly important investment by 
firms. A survey by a Boston-based marketing firm shows that 80% of consumers consider 
corporate support of social issues important in building public trust (Cone 2004). Anecdotal 
evidence also suggests that a growing number of multinational companies (such as Google, 
IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Microsoft, Nestle, Starbucks, Unilever, Wal-Mart, etc.) are actively 
involved in CSR initiatives aimed at creating shared value among stakeholders (Porter and 
Kramer 2011).  
Besides the widespread attention to CSR issues, a global survey by KPMG reveals that 
CSR reporting becomes a standard practice for large and mid-cap companies around the 
world, with around three quarters of the 4,900 survey companies issuing CSR reports.4 The 
                                                     
3 We use the terms “CSR disclosures”, “CSR reporting”, and “sustainability reporting” interchangeably 
throughout the paper. 
4 See “The Road Ahead—The KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2017”, available at 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/be/pdf/2017/kpmg-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2017.pdf 
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increased prevalence of CSR reporting is also evident in Taiwan. The Taiwanese government 
initiated a regulation in year 2014 which mandates large firms and firms in certain industries 
to issue CSR reports based on the sustainability reporting guidelines developed by the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI).5 In our study we focus on voluntary reporting as the mandatory 
rules only apply to a subset of firms and there are still many firms providing CSR 
reports/assurance voluntarily. As shown by Figure 1, in our sample the percentage of firms 
voluntarily issuing stand-alone CSR reports keeps growing, from 0.5% in year 2006 to 12.4% 
in year 2017. Similarly, in the sample with CSR reports the proportion of obtaining third-
party assurance increases sharply from 2006 to 2009 and remains stable around 30%~40% 
thereafter.6 This highlights an important trend in the awareness of providing credible CSR 
information even without the mandatory requirement.  
As social and environmental issues are now at the forefront of corporate governance in 
many countries, CSR is often a critical item on boards’ agendas and boards have major 
responsibility in achieving CSR objectives (Elkington 2006; Kakabadse 2007; Mackenzie 
2007). Accordingly, a considerable amount of research suggests that various board attributes 
have significant influence on CSR performance as well as CSR disclosures (see Rao and Tilt 
[2015] for a complete review). Even though a reasonable consensus exists in the literature 
suggesting that board composition (such as independence, size, and ownership) plays an 
important role in promoting CSR investment, there is little research directly examining the 
effect of director expertise on CSR reporting.  
Prior research suggests that CSR reporting has a positive impact on stakeholders’ 
perceptions of firm performance and firm value (Cormier, Ledoux, and Magnan 2011; El 
                                                     
5 Effective from fiscal year 2014, firms subject to mandatory CSR reporting include: (a) listed firms in the food, 
chemical, and financial industries, and (b) firms with a paid-in capital of NTD $10 billion or above. In addition, 
firms in the food industry are required to obtain auditor assurance on their CSR reports. Further, staring from 
fiscal year 2016, the threshold for criterion (b) is lowered down to paid-in capital of NTD $5 billion or above. 
6 Casey and Grenier (2015) study a sample of U.S. firms during 1993-2010 and document that the average 
percentage of voluntary CSR reports (assurance) is 2.6% (8.7%). 
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Ghoul et al. 2011; Goss and Roberts 2011; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen 2009). Moreover, 
CSR reporting can serve as an accountability mechanism which helps reduce the information 
asymmetry between managers and investors as well as other stakeholders (Dhaliwal et al. 
2011, 2012). Dai et al. (2019) further show that higher levels of CSR information disclosures 
reduce the stock price crash risk.  
Dubbink et al. (2008) argue that transparency is a crucial condition to implement a CSR 
policy, and effective boards of directors tend to encourage higher disclosure transparency 
(Jamali, Saﬁeddine, and Rabbath 2008). We believe firms with academic faculty members on 
the board are more likely to disclose CSR-related issues. First, academics are in general 
perceived to possess higher ethical and socially responsible standards (Baumgarten 1982; 
Charnov 1987; O’Connell 1998). Second, professors tend to be established scholars with 
strong reputations and thus have higher incentives to protect their long-built reputation 
(Yermack 2004).  
Our empirical results generally support our predictions. First, we find that firms with 
academic directors are more likely to issue a stand-alone CSR report and obtain third-party 
assurance on their CSR reports. Second, we also find a positive association between CSR 
reporting and academic directors with industry expertise, suggesting that industry-specific 
knowledge is important to the application of CSR-related practices. Inconsistent with 
expectations, however, we find only limited evidence that academic directors’ accounting 
expertise has a significant effect on CSR reporting. This highlights the differential expertise 
requirement between financial reporting and non-financial reporting. All of our results are 
robust to controlling for CSR performance and considering the endogeneity of the choice of 
academic directors.  
Further cross-sectional analyses show that the positive impact of academic directors as 
well as their industry expertise on firms’ propensity of CSR reporting is stronger in high-
growth firms, firms with higher institutional ownership, and firms with a larger divergence 
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between control rights and cash flow rights. The findings suggest that academic directors 
exert a greater influence on firms facing higher information asymmetry and that academic 
director expertise plays a more important role in encouraging better CSR reporting for firms 
with higher agency problems.   
Our study makes the following contributions. First, we add to the literature studying 
how board characteristics affect CSR activities. Prior research documents that board 
heterogeneity such as gender, age, and ethnicity has a significant effect on CSR performance. 
We show that directors’ academic background as well as industry expertise are related to a 
firm’s disclosures of CSR activities. Our focus on the role of academic directors also 
addresses direct calls for more involvement of the academic accounting profession in CSR-
related issues in the post-Erron era (Owen 2005).  
Second, prior research provides evidence on the effectiveness of academic directors in 
the monitoring of firms’ financial performance. We add to this literature by extending 
academic directors’ advice and oversight functions to social performance. Our findings that 
the presence of academic directors can promote better sustainability reporting suggest that 
academic directors contribute not only to shareholder value but also to wider stakeholder 
interests. Furthermore, our results are also consistent with studies arguing that outside 
directors are not homogenous (Anderson et al. 2011; Fich 2005). More specifically, additional 
attributes such as industry expertise could be important in making academic directors more 
beneficial to the firm. 
Third, our study also contributes to a growing literature that examines the determinants 
of sustainability reporting. In response to the call of Brennan and Solomon (2008) for more 
research on social and environmental reporting, many researchers using data from different 
countries have explored the effect of various governance attributes on CSR disclosures. We 
exploit the unique regulation regarding academic directors in Taiwan and identify directors’ 
industry expertise as a significant determinant of CSR reporting. While regulators and 
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researchers emphasize director expertise as a prescription for good financial reporting, our 
findings provide additional insights that director industry expertise also plays a role in the 
provision of non-financial disclosures.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature 
and develops research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research methodology. Data and 
sample statistics are summarized in Section 4. Section 5 presents the main empirical results. 
Section 6 provides additional analyses as well as robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the 
paper.   
2. Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1 Institutional Background 
The conventional governance scheme in Taiwan consists of a board of directors and 
supervisors. The board of directors is legally responsible for management decision making, 
and the board of supervisors is set up separately from the board of directors to counterbalance 
the power of the board. The supervisors’ responsibility is to monitor director affairs, and to 
ensure the quality of the financial statements. Starting from year 2006, the Securities 
Exchange Act allows public companies to adopt the independent director scheme, similar to 
the Anglo-Saxon governance system.7 The regulation specifies that independent directors 
need to possess one of the following qualifications with at least five years of experiences: (a) 
working as a faculty (lecturer or the above positions) in universities; (b) having professional 
licenses such as lawyers, judges, or certified public accountants (CPAs); (c) having work 
experiences related to business, law, finance, accounting, or other fields related to the 
company’s operation. 
2.2 Board Heterogeneity and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Numerous studies have examined how board heterogeneity affects corporate behavior 
                                                     
7 Effective from year 2007, all listed financial companies as well as listed non-financial companies with a paid-
in capital of NTD $50 billion or above are required to have independent directors on the board.  
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Anderson et al. (2011) suggest that board members with diverse backgrounds can bring 
valuable experiences, knowledge, and perspectives to the boardroom, which in turn improve 
the effectiveness or efficacy of monitoring and advising managers. Consistent with this 
argument, many studies find that board diversity is positively related to firms’ financial 
performance (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold 2000; White et al. 
2014). In the aspect of CSR, a majority of studies document a positive relation between board 
independence and CSR engagement, supporting that outside directors tend to be more 
responsible (Ibrahim and Angelidis 1995; Jo and Harjoto 2011; Post, Rahman, and Rubow 
2011). Moreover, a considerable amount of evidence shows that female directors have a 
positive impact on the level of a firm’s CSR involvement (Bear, Rahman, and Post 2010; 
Boulouta 2013; Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, and Ruiz 2012; Hafsi and Turgut 2013; Williams 
2003; Zhang 2012). In addition to gender diversity, director age and tenure are also found to 
have some influence on CSR engagement (Hafsi and Turgut 2013; Post, Rahman, and Rubow 
2011).  
A very limited number of studies examine the influence of directors’ occupational 
background on CSR. For example, Ibrahim, Howard, and Angelidis (2003) find that 
government officials and physicians have different values and perspectives towards social 
performance. Siciliano (1996) finds that greater occupational diversity at the board level is 
positively related to social performance. Hillman, Keim, and Luce (2001) examine the 
relation between the presence of stakeholder directors (e.g., suppliers, employees, and 
community representatives) and CSR performance and find that certain types of stakeholder 
directors affect diversity and environment performance. Cho et al. (2017), the closest study to 
ours, find that firms with professor-directors exhibit higher CSR performance ratings. We 
augment the above studies by expanding the scope of CSR performance to CSR reporting, 
which is a major tool to communicate firms’ CSR activities to wider stakeholders 
(Fernandez-Feijoo et al. 2014). As the transparency of CSR reports is critical to promote 
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socially responsible behavior (Dubbink et al. 2008), our examination of academic expertise as 
one potential determinant of CSR reporting adds value to the literature.  
2.3 Academic Directors and Corporate Outcomes 
A few studies investigate the role of professors on the board. For instance, White et al. 
(2014) show that small firms are more likely to appoint academic directors and that the 
market reacts favorably to appointments of academics with specialized background. Francis, 
Hasan, and Wu (2015) find that the presence of academic directors is associated with greater 
operating performance, higher innovation, higher stock price informativeness, lower earnings 
management, and better corporate governance. Two recent studies explore the regulatory 
setting in China and find that the stock market reacts negatively to academic directors’ 
resignations (Chen et al. 2019; Pang et al. 2018). These evidence suggests that academic 
directors are valuable advisors and effective monitors who bring positive impact on firms’ 
financial performance. Nevertheless, we know little about whether academic directors 
influence a firm’s decision-making in the CSR reporting dimension.  
2.4 Characteristics of Academics and CSR Reporting 
Researchers suggest that outside directors have incentives to develop reputations as 
good monitors in order to signal their expertise to the external market, which rewards them 
with additional directorships (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). When compared with 
other outside directors, academics have even fewer direct connections with insiders and thus 
lower conflicts of interests with managers (Francis, Hasan, and Wu 2015). Therefore, 
academic directors tend to be less influenced by others and can protect their reputations by 
exercising independent judgement (Jiang and Murphy 2007). Prior studies have found that 
more independent outside directors are related to lower information asymmetry and higher 
levels of voluntary disclosures (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005; Chau and Gray 2010; 
Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Huafang and Jianguo 2007; Liao, Luo, and Tang 2014). 
Accordingly, we expect academic directors will require managers to provide more transparent 
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information to the public. 
Several studies indicate that university professors are deemed socially obligated in 
diverse aspects by the public. For instance, Baumgarten (1982) argues that university teachers 
have a social obligation to help other citizens and that the academic profession should have 
higher ethical standards to seek social benefits. Charnov (1987) asserts that professors must 
take roles in being ethical professionals. Similarly, O’Connell (1998) suggests that professors 
are obligated to fulfill their own moral responsibilities. Owen (2005) further advocates that 
the academic accounting profession exercise a larger impact on the promotion of CSR 
awareness and social reporting for the business society. If academic directors possess higher 
levels of ethical standards and thus more positive attitude toward CSR, they are more likely 
to promote CSR activities. Given that academic directors are also more independent 
monitors, they should encourage a higher level of accountability and transparency in the 
reporting of CSR-related issues. We therefore formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
H1: The presence of academic directors is positively associated with CSR reporting. 
We next examine how academic directors’ differential expertise affects CSR reporting. 
Prior literature suggests that industry characteristics play an important role in CSR 
disclosures. Due to a greater exposure to social and environmental risks, firms in high-
pollution industries (such as mining and utilities) are more likely to issue CSR reports and 
obtain CSR assurance (Casey and Grenier 2015; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 2009). 
Trotman and Trotman (2013) points out industry expertise as one of the highly valued 
attributes of board members. Kor and Misangyi (2008) document evidence that outside 
directors’ industry experience helps to mitigate the competitive disadvantage confronting a 
firm that is new in an industry. Cohen et al. (2014) also suggest that there are industry-
specific practices which require specialized knowledge for effective communication. Many 
studies have found that independent directors with industry expertise contributes to more 
effective monitoring, leading to higher firm value and lower earnings management (Cohen et 
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al. 2014; Drobetz et al. 2018; Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash 2018; Wang, Xie, and Zhu 2015). 
Thus we expect academic directors with industry expertise could be more situated to 
understand an industry’s complexities and risks, and thus promote better CSR reporting. 
Studies also suggest that the accounting profession has a stronger reputation for 
integrity, independence, and professional skepticism (Wallage 2000; Knechel et al. 2006). 
Accountants also must adhere to professional and organization ethical codes of conduct 
(Power 1997). Firms who have accounting experts on board tend to have better financial 
reporting quality (Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi 2010; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). 
Accounting expertise also facilitates the board’s communication with external auditors 
(Abbott et al. 2003; Hoitash, Hoitash, and Bedard 2009). Therefore, we expect academic 
directors who also have accounting expertise would contribute to higher-quality CSR 
reporting. Based on the above discussions, our second set of hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
H2a: Academic directors with industry expertise is positively associated with CSR 
reporting. 
H2b: Academic directors with accounting expertise is positively associated with CSR 
reporting. 
Despite the above arguments, there are alternative views that might work against our 
predictions. Opponents of CSR argue that it is a manifestation of agency problem as 
managers often invest in CSR activities for personal benefits with the potential to hamper 
shareholder value (e.g., Friedman 1970; Bénabou and Tirole 2010; Krüger 2015; Cheng et al. 
2016). Recent studies provide empirical evidence that mandatory requirements of CSR 
spending or CSR disclosures are detrimental to firm value, suggesting that CSR generates 
positive externalities at the expense of shareholders (Chen et al. 2018; Manchiraju and 
Rajgopal 2017). According to this negative perspective of CSR, academic directors might not 
have a positive influence on CSR reporting if they believe the agency cost argument.  
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3. Research Design 
We test our hypotheses using the following regression model: 


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Following prior literature (Casey and Grenier 2015; Simnett, Vanstraelen, and Chua 
2009), we use two measures of CSR reporting. The first measure is CSR, which is an 
indicator equal to one if the firm issues a stand-alone CSR report, and zero otherwise. The 
second measure is ASSURE, which is an indicator equal to one if the firm obtains third-party 
assurance on its CSR report, and zero otherwise.   
In equation (1), our main variable of interest is DIR_EXP, which measures different 
types of director expertise. In the test of H1, DIR_EXP is measured by DIR_ACAD, an 
indicator equal to one if the firm has at least one independent director with academic 
expertise, and zero otherwise. We define an independent director as having academic 
expertise if he/she is a full-time faculty affiliated with university institutions.8  
To test H2a, we measure director expertise by ACAD_IND, an indicator equal to one if 
the firm has at least one academic director with industry expertise, and zero otherwise. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Cohen et al. 2014; Wang, Xie, and Zhu 2015), we define a 
director as having industry expertise if he/she is/was employed by another firm that operates 
in the same industry as the firm in which he/she now serves as an independent director.9  
In the test of H2b, we measure director expertise by ACAD_ACCT, an indicator equal to 
one if the firm has at least one academic director with accounting expertise, and zero 
otherwise. Following prior research (Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Naissi 2010), we define an 
                                                     
8 Prior studies tend to also distinguish academics with and without administrative jobs (White et al. 2014; 
Francis, Hasan, and Wu 2015). Nevertheless, in Taiwan the regulation prohibits professors holding 
administrative positions to sit on corporate boards. As a result, we do not make such classifications.   
9 Our results are robust if we define industry expertise as serving on the board of two additional firms within the 
same industry.   
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academic director as having accounting expertise if he/she has at least one of the following 
qualifications or experiences: CPA, auditor, controller, chief accounting officer, and principal 
accounting officer.10  
Following prior studies, we include various firm-level control variables that could 
potentially influence firms’ CSR reporting. Asset turnover, ATO, is defined as net sales 
divided by year-end total assets. Profit margin, PM, is measured by income before 
extraordinary items divided by net sales. CFO is cash flow from operations divided by total 
assets. LEV is total debt divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio of equity. 
SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. RD is research and development 
expenses scaled by net sales. ADV is advertising expenses scaled by net sales. BDIND is an 
indicator that equals one if the firm has at least one independent director, and zero otherwise. 
Finally, we include firm fixed effect and year fixed effect to account for variation in CSR 
reporting that is potentially driven by unobserved heterogeneities across firms and years. To 
mitigate the influence of potential outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the top 
and bottom 0.5 percentiles. The Appendix provides a summary of all variable definitions.  
We estimate equation (1) by OLS regression (i.e., linear probability model in our case of 
dichotomous outcome variable). This estimation facilitates interpretation of the economic 
significance of the findings as one can easily interpret economic significance simply by 
looking at the coefficient estimates (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Hanlon and Hoopes 2014). 
Moreover, the use of linear probability model does not impose potential bias or inconsistency 
on the coefficients and standard errors (Greene 2004). To adjust for the well-known problem 
of heteroscedasticity, we use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. As a 
robustness test, we conduct all analyses using logistic regression and find qualitatively 
similar results.  
                                                     
10 Some academics work in the industry before joining the academia.  
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4. Data and Sample Summary Statistics 
4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
Our sample selection process begins with all of the listed nonfinancial companies 
included in the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database for fiscal years 2006-2017. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Chen et al. 2018), we do not include financial firms as 
they are subject to different regulations. The sample period starts from 2006 because it is the 
year when the independent director regulation was introduced in Taiwan. We obtain CSR and 
financial data from TEJ. For directors’ expertise data, we manually confirm each director’s 
background (from company website and university website) based on the initial data provided 
by TEJ.    
The initial sample consists of 20,441 firm-years. We delete 2,776 observations that lack 
information on the background of independent directors. As discussed earlier, some firms that 
meet specified criteria are required to issue CSR reports, thus we remove 955 observations 
that are subject to mandatory CSR reporting.11 Finally, we delete 2,786 observations with 
missing data on any of the empirical variables. The final sample consists of 13,924 
observations from 1,431 companies.  
In Table 1, we present the sample distribution by year and by industry. Panel A shows 
that the percentage of firms with at least on professor on the board is on average 25.17% in 
the full sample and 40.61% in the sample having independent directors.12 In addition, the 
number (percentage) of firms with academic directors keeps increasing, from 179 (17.46%) 
in year 2006 to 454 (38.18%) in year 2017. The results also show that academic directors 
with industry expertise on average account for 5.10% of the full sample (20.26% within the 
sample having academic directors), while academic directors with accounting expertise on 
                                                     
11 As the mandatory CSR reporting starts from year 2014, we also conduct the empirical tests using a sample 
period from 2006 to 2013. All of the findings are unchanged.  
12 The number of observations with independent directors is 8,631. 
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average account for 1.95% of the full sample (7.73% within the sample having academic 
directors).   
Table 1 Panel B shows that our sample encompasses a broad cross-section of industries. 
The most heavily represented industry in our sample is electronic components (14.71%), 
followed by the semiconductor industry (8.52%). There is also a large variation in the 
proportion of observations with academic directors across industry sectors. The 
semiconductor industry has the highest proportion (41.23%) of firm-years that have academic 
directors, while the rubber products industry has the lowest proportion (3.33%). Further, the 
biotechnology industry has the highest percentage of academic directors with industry 
expertise (8.28% of the full sample and 23.43% within the sample with academic directors), 
likely due to the higher requirement of industry-specific knowledge in the biotech industry. 
The machinery has the highest percentage of academic directors with accounting expertise 
(3.61% of the full sample and 13.16% within the sample with academic directors).   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the empirical variables used in the regression 
analysis. The full sample summary in Panel A shows that, 7.2% of the sample voluntarily 
issue a stand-alone CSR report, and 2.4% of the sample obtain third-party assurance on the 
CSR report. Also, 62% of our sample have at least one independent director on the board. 
Panel B of Table 2 performs a univariate analysis that compares the sample with and without 
academic directors. The results indicate that the average incidence of issuing a CSR report in 
the sample with academic directors is 10.6%, relative to 6.0% in the sample without 
academic directors. The difference is significant at the 1% level. The sample with academic 
directors also has a significantly higher proportion in obtaining CSR report assurance (mean 
of 4.4% versus 1.8%). These results provide preliminary evidence that the presence of 
academic directors is positively associated with CSR reporting.  
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 reports the correlations among all variables. Consistent with the univariate 
results in Table 2 Panel B, DIR_ACAD is significantly and positively correlated with both 
CSR (0.076) and ASSURE (0.074). We observe similar findings for other expertise measures: 
Both ACAD_IND and ACAD_ACCT have positive and significant correlations with CSR and 
ASSURE. These results provide univariate evidence in support of our research hypotheses.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Main Analyses 
Table 4 presents the regression results of the first hypothesis. In column (1), we find that 
the coefficient on DIR_ACAD is positive and significant at the 5% level, and that this effect is 
incremental to having an independent director on the board. The coefficient estimate suggests 
that the probability of issuing a stand-alone CSR report in firms with academic directors is 
2.1% higher than in firms without any academic directors. The magnitude of this difference is 
also economically significant given that the average probability of issuing CSR reports in the 
sample is 7.2%. In column (2) where the dependent variable is ASSURE, we also find a 
positive and significant coefficient on DIR_ACAD.  
As indicated by the univariate analysis, firms with academic directors differ from those 
without academic directors along several dimensions, suggesting potential endogeneity 
associated with the decision to appoint academic directors. Therefore, we further employ 
propensity score matching (PSM) to control for observable differences between these two 
subsamples. As suggested by Shipman et al. (2017), we estimate the propensity score of 
having academic directors by logistic regression which regresses DIR_ACAD on all the 
control variables in model (1). We present the regression results of model (1) based on the 
matched sample in Table 4 columns (3) and (4). Consistently, the coefficients on DIR_ACAD 
are significantly positive, and the results suggest that in firms with academic directors the 
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probability of issuing CSR reports (getting CSR reports assurance) is 3% (1.7%) higher than 
in firms without academic directors. Overall, the findings support H1 that the presence of 
academic directors is positively associated with CSR reporting.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 5 presents the regression results of the second hypothesis. We perform this 
analysis based on the full sample (Panel A) and the subsample with academic directors (Panel 
B). To test the incremental effect of industry expertise and accounting expertise, we control 
for the presence of academic directors (DIR_ACAD) in this analysis. In columns (1) and (2), 
we find that ACAD_IND is positively associated with ASSURE (significant at p<0.01 level) 
although ACAD_IND is not significantly related to CSR. Similar to Table 4, we also use a 
propensity score matched sample to test hypothesis 2. The results in columns (3) and (4) 
indicate that based on the PSM sample, the coefficients on ACAD_IND are both positive and 
significant. Taken together, the findings suggest that, after controlling for the presence of 
academic directors, academic directors’ industry expertise has an incremental effect on CSR 
reporting, in particular the assurance of CSR reports. Consistent results are observed in 
columns (3) and (4) where the analysis is based on the propensity score matched sample. 
Columns (5) through (8) of Table 5 relate to the test of H2b which examines the effect of 
academic directors’ accounting expertise. In the full sample, the coefficient on ACAD_ACCT 
is not significant, suggesting that accounting expertise does not have incremental effect on 
CSR reporting. The results are similar based on the PSM sample, although we find a 
marginally significant coefficient when the dependent variable is ASSURE. Overall, the 
results provide only limited support of H2b that academic directors’ accounting expertise is 
positively related to CSR reporting. 
Instead of controlling for DIR_ACAD in the model, in Panel B we estimate the 
regression by limiting the sample to the subset of firms with academic directors. Generally, 
the results are consistent with those in Panel A and thus the inferences do not change in this 
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subsample analysis. Taken together, we find strong support of H2a that firms having 
academic directors with industry expertise are more likely to issue CSR reports as well as 
obtain CSR report assurance. However, limited evidence suggests that academic directors’ 
accounting expertise is positively related to CSR reporting. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
5.2 Robustness Tests—Controlling for CSR Performance 
While our main focus is on CSR reporting, it is likely that firms with better CSR 
performance have higher incentives to disclose CSR information (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). To 
ensure the robustness of our findings, we include CSR performance as another control 
variable. Unlike prior studies that commonly use KLD or ASSET4 ratings as measures of 
CSR performance, similar data is not available in Taiwan. The only proxy of CSR 
performance is an award data provided by CommonWealth Magazine (CWM hereafter)—
Taiwan’s most influential and professional business magazine. Starting from 2007, CWM 
evaluates companies’ CSR performance in four dimensions, including corporate governance, 
corporate commitment, social engagement, and environmental sustainability, and award 50 
companies (30 among large enterprises, 10 among mid-sized enterprises, and 10 among 
foreign enterprises) for their excellence in CSR.13 Accordingly, we create an indicator 
CSRPERF that equals one if a firm receives a CSR award, and zero otherwise, and add this 
variable into equation (1). This proxy is noisy as it is dichotomous and does not consider the 
variation in CSR performance among award firms as well as firms without awards. 
Nevertheless, it is worth examining whether our results are robust to the consideration of 
CSR performance. The regression results of controlling for CSRPERF are presented in Table 
6.14  
                                                     
13 Starting from year 2015, CWM expands the scope and give awards to 100 companies, including 50 among 
large enterprises, 15 among mid-sized enterprises, 15 among foreign enterprises, and 20 among small 
enterprises. 
14 It is also likely that firms providing voluntary CSR reporting have a higher chance of receiving the CSR 
award. Therefore, rather than controlling for the award indicator, we perform an alternative analysis by 
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
We find that the coefficients on CSRPERF are consistently positive and significant 
across models, supporting the conjecture that firms with better CSR performance are more 
likely to issue CSR reports and obtain assurance. After controlling for the effect of CSR 
performance, we still find a significantly positive coefficient on DIR_ACAD in columns (1) 
and (2). Therefore, our inferences that the presence of academic directors is positively related 
to CSR reporting remain unchanged. After controlling for CSR performance, the incremental 
effect of industry expertise becomes weaker. As shown in columns (3) and (4), we only find a 
significant coefficient on ACAD_IND in the assurance model. The last two columns pertain to 
the incremental effect of academic directors’ accounting expertise. Similar to the main 
results, we do not find a significant coefficient on ACAD_ACCT except in column (6) where 
the coefficient is marginally significant. These results again suggest that the presence of 
accounting expertise for academic directors appears to have a limited impact on CSR 
reporting. 
5.3 Alternative Measure of Academic Expertise 
Prior studies show that the market participants view academic director appointments 
differently based on the director’s academic specialization (e.g., White et al. 2014). Since the 
accounting profession is considered to have the most influence on promoting transparent 
disclosures, we further consider how the presence of accounting professor on the board 
affects CSR reporting. For this analysis, we replace DIR_ACAD with an indicator 
DIR_ACAD_ACC, which equals 1 if the firm has an academic director who is a full-time 
university faculty in the department of accounting, and 0 otherwise. The results of this 
analysis are reported in Table 7. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 show a positive and significant coefficient on 
                                                     
removing all firms that have received CSR awards from the sample. All of the results remain unchanged. 
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DIR_ACAD_ACC, suggesting that the presence of accounting professors on the board has a 
positive influence on the firm’s CSR reporting decision. The results also hold after we control 
for CSR performance in columns (3) and (4). We also find that the coefficient estimates are 
larger than DIR_ACAD, a result suggesting that relative to firms without accounting faculty 
directors, in firms with accounting faculty directors the probability of issuing CSR reports 
and getting third-party assurance is 5% and 4% higher, respectively. These findings indicate 
that academic directors with accounting specialization have a more influential impact on 
firms’ decision to provide more CSR disclosures.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
6. Additional Analyses 
In this section we explore cross-sectional variations of the effect of academic directors 
on CSR reporting. Since in the main analysis we do not find any significant effect of 
academic directors’ accounting expertise on CSR reporting, in the following cross-sectional 
tests we do not include the accounting expertise variable in the regression model. 
The effect of growth 
Prior studies suggest that high-growth firms might benefit more from the expertise of 
academic directors (White et al. 2014) and firms in the growth stage also have higher demand 
for directors with industry expertise (Carcello, Hermanson, and Ye 2011). Accordingly, we 
expect the positive relation between academic directors and CSR reporting to be more 
pronounced in firms with higher growth rate. We test this effect by partitioning the sample 
into tercile based on the value of annual sales growth rate. Table 8 reports the regression 
results for the highest-growth sample and the lowest-growth sample. 
Columns (1) through (4) of Table 8 show that the coefficient on DIR_ACAD is positive 
and significant only in the high-growth sample, suggesting that the positive effect of 
academic directors on CSR reporting is more pronounced in high-growth firms. Columns (5) 
through (8) relate to the results after adding the variable measuring academic directors with 
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industry expertise. We also find a positive and significant coefficient on ACAD_IND in the 
high-growth sample but not in the low-growth sample, supporting a greater demand for 
academic directors’ industry expertise in high-growth firms. Prior research suggests that firms 
with higher growth opportunities usually face higher information asymmetry as well as 
higher proprietary costs (Bamber and Cheon 1998). Thus our findings suggest that academic 
directors play a more influential role in increasing high-growth firms’ incentives to disclose 
more CSR information.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The effect of institutional ownership 
Next, we examine whether the association between academic directors and CSR 
reporting varies with institutional ownership. Studies show that an increasing number of 
investors, especially institutional investors, are integrating CSR performance into their 
investment decisions due to both financial and social considerations (Dyck et al. 2019). In 
addition, institutional investors tend to have higher information demand and are more capable 
of requesting information from managers (Ajinkya et al. 2005; Dhaliwal et al. 2011). 
Consequently, the pressure of providing CSR reports could be greater for firms who have 
higher institutional ownership. We again divide the sample into tercile based on the value of 
institutional ownership and compare the samples in the top tercile and bottom tercile. Table 9 
presents the regression results. 
The first four columns of Table 9 indicate that the coefficient on DIR_ACAD is 
significantly positive in the sample with high institutional ownership but not significant in the 
low-ownership sample. Consistently, the last four columns of Table 9 show a positive and 
significant coefficient on ACAD_IND only in the sample with high institutional ownership. 
These results suggest that the effect of academic directors as well as academic directors’ 
industry expertise is more pronounced when firms have higher institutional ownership. The 
findings are consistent with institutional investors having a greater demand for non-financial 
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information and placing pressures for firms to provide more CSR disclosures. As greater 
institutional ownership also indicates better monitoring, our results suggest that the oversight 
function provided by institutional investors and academic directors appear to be 
complements.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
The effect of corporate governance 
Finally, we test whether corporate governance characteristics moderate the relation 
between academic directors and CSR reporting. Listed companies in Taiwan are 
characterized by a high concentration of ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002). For example, Yeh (2005) 
reveals that approximately 70% of the listed firms in Taiwan have controlling shareholders. 
Given this ownership structure, Taiwanese listed firms tend to have the problem of a large 
divergence between the ultimate owner’s control and the level of equity ownership (Fan and 
Wong 2002; Chin et al. 2006). Studies show that financial reporting quality is lower when 
there is a large divergence between controlling shareholders’ voting rights and their cash flow 
rights (Francis et al. 2005; Sue et al. 2013). Therefore, we further examine whether the 
association between academic directors and CSR reporting varies with the control-ownership 
divergence. To perform this test, we define divergence as one minus the cash flow rights 
divided by the voting rights (Fan and Wong 2002; Haw et al. 2004). The closer the value of 
divergence is to one, the more detached are the controlling owner’s control rights from their 
cash flow rights. We then partition our sample into three groups based on the value of 
control-ownership divergence and compare the regression results for the top tercile and 
bottom tercile. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10 shows that the coefficient on DIR_ACAD is consistently positive and 
significant only in the high-divergence sample. This result suggests that the effect of 
academic directors on CSR reporting is stronger in firms with higher agency problems. We 
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find consistent evidence in columns (5) through (8) where ACAD_IND is significantly 
positive only in the sample with high divergence, indicating a stronger effect of academic 
directors’ industry expertise for poorly-governed firms. Overall, our findings collectively 
support a more pronounced effect of academic expertise on CSR reporting in firms with 
weaker corporate governance, suggesting a substitute relation between director expertise and 
other governance mechanisms.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
7. Conclusion 
This study empirically investigates whether the presence of academic directors affects a 
firm’s CSR reporting. Based on the argument that academics tend to be more independent 
from corporate insiders and generally possess a higher sense of social responsibility and 
ethical standards, we expect firms with academic directors are more likely to provide CSR-
related disclosures. Consistent with our expectations, we find that firms having academic 
directors on the board are more likely to voluntarily issue stand-alone CSR reports as well as 
obtain third-party assurance on CSR reports. In particular, the results are stronger if the 
academic director is a faculty at the department of accounting. Since academics might lack 
industry-specific experiences, we further examine whether CSR reporting is influenced by 
academics having two or more directorships within the same industry. This analysis shows 
that academics with industry expertise has a positive influence on firms’ propensity of issuing 
CSR reports as well as getting external assurance. Finally, we test whether academics with 
accounting expertise is associated with better CSR reporting as the accounting profession is 
considered having greater integrity as well as higher professional knowledge about 
information disclosures. However, the empirical results provide limited evidence that 
academic directors with accounting expertise (measured by practitioner accounting 
experience) is positively related to a firm’s CSR reporting.  
We also find some cross-sectional variation in the association between academic 
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expertise and CSR reporting. More specifically, the effect of academic directors as well as 
their industry expertise is more pronounced in firms with higher growth, greater institutional 
ownership, and larger divergence between control rights and cash flow rights. These findings 
suggest that academic directors exert a greater influence on CSR disclosures in firms facing 
higher information demand from investors. Moreover, the effectiveness of academic 
directors’ oversight function and industry expertise is stronger in firms suffering from higher 
agency problems.  
Our study makes an important step toward a better understanding of the value of 
academic directors in CSR reporting. While prior literature documents the effect of academic 
directors on firms’ financial performance, we provide insight on the role of academic 
directors in the disclosure of non-financial information. Our findings suggest that directors 
from academia add value not only to shareholders but also to wider stakeholders. Given the 
increasing awareness of CSR among the society, our findings have important implications to 
corporations as well as the policy makers.  
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Appendix: Summary of Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
CSR An indicator equal to one if the firm issues a stand-alone CSR 
report, and zero otherwise. 
ASSURE An indicator equal to one if the firm obtains third-party assurance 
on its CSR report, and zero otherwise. 
DIR_ACAD An indicator equal to one if the firm has at least one independent 
director who is a full-time faculty affiliated with university 
institutions, and zero otherwise. 
DIR_ACAD_ACC An indicator equal to one if the firm has at least one academic 
director who is an accounting faculty, and zero otherwise. 
ACAD_IND An indicator equal to one if the firm has at least one academic 
director with industry expertise, and zero otherwise. 
ACAD_ACCT An indicator equal to one if the firm has at least one academic 
director with accounting expertise, and zero otherwise. 
ATO Asset turnover, defined as net sales divided by year-end total 
assets. 
PM Profit margin, measured by income before extraordinary items 
divided by net sales. 
CFO Cash flow from operations divided by total assets.  
LEV Total debt divided by total assets. 
MTB The market-to-book ratio of equity. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets. 
RD Research and development expenses scaled by net sales. 
ADV Advertising expenses scaled by net sales. 
BDIND An indicator that equals one if the firm has at least one 
independent director, and zero otherwise. 
CSRPERF An indicator that equals one if the firm receives an award for CSR 
performance, and zero otherwise. 
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Figure 1 Trend of Voluntary CSR Reporting/Assurance 
 
Note: The percentage of assurance is based on the sample that voluntairy issues CSR reports.  
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Table 1 Sample distributions of sample firms by year and industry 
Panel A: Distribution of sample firms by year 
Year  # (%) of firms 
 
# (%) of firms with at 
least one academic 
director (DIR_ACAD=1) 
 
# (%) of firms having  
academic director with 
industry expertise 
(ACCT_IND=1)  
 
# (%) of firms having 
academic director 
with accounting expertise 
(ACAD_ACCT=1)  
2006  1,025 (7.36%)   179 (17.46%)   88 (8.59%)   44 (4.29%) 
2007  1,056 (7.58%)   215 (20.36%)   46 (4.36%)   29 (2.75%) 
2008  1,090 (7.83%)   230 (21.10%)   32 (2.94%)   16 (1.47%) 
2009  1,129 (8.11%)   229 (20.28%)   15 (1.33%)   6 (0.53%) 
2010  1,161 (8.34%)   236 (20.33%)   23 (1.98%)   7 (0.60%) 
2011  1,201 (8.63%)   268 (22.31%)   60 (5.00%)   27 (2.25%) 
2012  1,238 (8.89%)   290 (23.42%)   55 (4.44%)   25 (2.02%) 
2013  1,289 (9.26%)   323 (25.06%)   51 (3.96%)   14 (1.09%) 
2014  1,176 (8.45%)   303 (25.77%)   48 (4.08%)   20 (1.70%) 
2015  1,212 (8.70%)   372 (30.69%)   78 (6.44%)   38 (3.14%) 
2016  1,158 (8.32%)   406 (35.06%)   83 (7.17%)   25 (2.16%) 
2017  1,189 (8.54%)   454 (38.18%)   131 (11.02%)   20 (1.68%) 
Total  13,924 (100.00%)   3,505 (25.17%)   710 (5.10%)   271 (1.95%) 
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Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by industry 
Industry # (%) of firm-years 
 
# (%) of observations 
with at least one 
academic director 
(DIR_ACAD=1) 
 
# (%) of observations 
having  
academic director with 
industry expertise 
(ACCT_IND=1)  
 # (%) of observations 
having 
academic director 
with accounting expertise 
(ACAD_ACCT=1)  
Cement  69 (0.50%)  5 (7.25%)  0 (0.00%)   0 (0.00%) 
Food  198 (1.42%)  12 (6.06%)  4 (2.02%)   0 (0.00%) 
Plastics  244 (1.75%)  41 (16.80%)  8 (3.28%)   4 (1.64%) 
Textile products  596 (4.28%)  39 (6.54%)  8 (1.34%)   2 (0.34%) 
Machinery  693 (4.98%)  190 (27.42%)  38 (5.48%)   25 (3.61%) 
Appliances 160 (1.15%)  13 (8.13%)  2 (1.25%)   0 (0.00%) 
Glass and glass 
products  
49 (0.35%) 
 
3 (6.12%)  2 (4.08%)   1 (2.04%) 
Paper products  70 (0.50%)  5 (7.14%)  0 (0.00%)   0 (0.00%) 
Iron and steel 458 (3.29%)  49 (10.70%)  18 (3.93%)   11 (2.40%) 
Rubber products  120 (0.86%)  4 (3.33%)  1 (0.83%)   0 (0.00%) 
Automobile 192 (1.38%)  19 (9.90%)  4 (2.08%)   3 (1.56%) 
Building materials and 
construction 
743 (5.34%) 
 
73 (9.83%)  19 (2.56%)   4 (0.54%) 
Shipping  216 (1.55%)  27 (12.50%)  8 (3.70%)   2 (0.93%) 
Tourism  225 (1.62%)  27 (12.00%)  12 (5.33%)   4 (1.78%) 
International trade 254 (1.82%)  50 (19.69%)  13 (5.12%)   2 (0.79%) 
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Chemical products 272 (1.95%)  35 (12.87%)  6 (2.21%)   3 (1.10%) 
Biotechnology 676 (4.85%)  239 (35.36%)  56 (8.28%)   24 (3.55%) 
Utilities 137 (0.98%)  8 (5.84%)  3 (2.19%)   0 (0.00%) 
Semiconductor  1,186 (8.52%)  489 (41.23%)  82 (6.91%)   41 (3.46%) 
Computers and 
peripherals 
993 (7.13%) 
 
297 (29.91%)  55 (5.54%)   18 (1.81%) 
Optoelectronics  1,034 (7.43%)  381 (36.85%)  71 (6.87%)   21 (2.03%) 
Communication 
equipment  
735 (5.28%) 
 
290 (39.46%)  56 (7.62%)   21 (2.86%) 
Electronic components  2,048 (14.71%)  533 (26.03%)  93 (4.54%)   31 (1.51%) 
Electronics distributors 399 (2.87%)  103 (25.81%)  22 (5.51%)   9 (2.26%) 
Information service 334 (2.40%)  113 (33.83%)  22 (6.59%)   4 (1.20%) 
Other electronics 763 (5.48%)  205 (26.87%)  44 (5.77%)   19 (2.49%) 
Others 1,060 (7.61%)  255 (24.06%)  65 (6.13%)   22 (2.08%) 
Total 13,924 (100.00%)  3,505 (25.17%)  710 (5.10%)   271 (1.95%) 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Full Sample (N=13,924) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
CSR 0.072 0.258 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ASSURE 0.024 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIR_ACAD 0.252 0.434 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ACAD_IND 0.051 0.220 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ACAD_ACCT 0.019 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ATO 0.856 0.458 0.527 0.786 1.104 
PM 0.062 0.124 0.012 0.060 0.128 
CFO 0.052 0.076 0.003 0.044 0.100 
LEV 0.408 0.170 0.271 0.408 0.533 
MTB 1.545 0.930 0.853 1.259 1.945 
SIZE 15.222 1.249 14.293 15.061 15.984 
RD 0.025 0.033 0.000 0.011 0.034 
ADV 0.039 0.035 0.012 0.028 0.053 
BDIND 0.620 0.485 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Sub-sample Partitioned by Academic Director 
 DIR_ACAD=1 (3,505 observations) DIR_ACAD=0 (10,419 observations) Difference 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median t-test Wilcoxon Z-test 
CSR 0.106 0.307 0.000 0.060 0.238 0.000 -9.017*** -8.991*** 
ASSURE 0.044 0.206 0.000 0.018 0.132 0.000 -8.806*** -8.781*** 
ATO 0.877 0.442 0.811 0.849 0.463 0.778 -3.134*** -4.006*** 
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PM 0.060 0.128 0.062 0.062 0.123 0.059 1.132 -0.761 
CFO 0.060 0.079 0.052 0.049 0.075 0.041 -7.742*** -7.339*** 
LEV 0.391 0.173 0.387 0.414 0.169 0.415 6.794*** 6.710*** 
MTB 1.754 1.018 1.464 1.475 0.888 1.199 -15.474*** -14.908*** 
SIZE 15.098 1.221 14.945 15.263 1.256 15.103 6.777*** 6.805*** 
RD 0.037 0.038 0.023 0.020 0.030 0.008 -27.572*** -27.905*** 
ADV 0.041 0.035 0.030 0.038 0.035 0.028 -4.223*** -5.313*** 
BDIND 0.992 0.091 1.000 0.495 0.500 0.000 -58.519*** -54.428*** 
Note: CSR is an indicator equal to one if the firm issues a stand-alone CSR report, and zero otherwise. ASSURE is an indicator equal to one if 
the firm obtains third-party assurance on its CSR report, and zero otherwise. DIR_ACAD is an indicator equal to one if the firm has at least 
one independent director with academic expertise, and zero otherwise. ACAD_IND is an indicator equal to one if the firm has at least one 
academic director with industry expertise, and zero otherwise. ACAD_ACCT is an indicator equal to one if the firm has at least one academic 
director with accounting expertise, and zero otherwise. Asset turnover, ATO, is defined as net sales divided by year-end total assets. Profit 
margin, PM, is measured by income before extraordinary items divided by net sales. CFO is cash flow from operations divided by total 
assets. LEV is total debt divided by total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio of equity. SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets. RD is research and development expenses scaled by net sales. ADV is advertising expenses scaled by net sales. BDIND is an indicator 
that equals one if the firm has at least one independent director, and zero otherwise. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3 Variable Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. CSR 1.000 0.569 0.076 0.050 0.021 0.083 0.022 0.067 0.056 0.042 0.061 0.230 0.027 -0.067 
2. ASSURE 0.569 1.000 0.074 0.065 0.028 0.050 0.031 0.038 0.048 0.060 0.053 0.190 0.007 -0.064 
3. DIR_ACAD 0.076 0.074 1.000 0.334 0.191 0.444 0.034 0.006 0.062 -0.057 0.126 -0.058 0.236 0.045 
4. ACAD_IND 0.050 0.065 0.334 1.000 0.570 0.180 0.010 0.008 0.023 -0.013 0.068 -0.021 0.077 0.027 
5. ACAD_ACCT 0.021 0.028 0.191 0.570 1.000 0.110 0.027 0.011 0.021 -0.014 0.056 -0.032 0.062 0.014 
6. BDIND 0.083 0.050 0.444 0.180 0.110 1.000 0.058 0.006 0.056 -0.085 0.178 -0.190 0.277 0.077 
7. ATO 0.022 0.031 0.027 0.010 0.024 0.049 1.000 -0.131 0.167 0.177 0.094 -0.010 -0.057 -0.139 
8. PM 0.066 0.038 -0.010 0.003 0.004 -0.018 -0.075 1.000 0.409 -0.242 0.353 0.198 -0.024 -0.002 
9. CFO 0.056 0.049 0.066 0.022 0.018 0.059 0.141 0.398 1.000 -0.277 0.230 0.021 0.131 0.046 
10.LEV 0.042 0.059 -0.058 -0.013 -0.015 -0.087 0.194 -0.199 -0.279 1.000 -0.091 0.324 -0.334 -0.203 
11.MTB 0.067 0.051 0.130 0.065 0.053 0.172 0.079 0.243 0.233 -0.079 1.000 -0.129 0.209 0.149 
12.SIZE 0.265 0.234 -0.057 -0.020 -0.027 -0.185 0.004 0.210 0.019 0.320 -0.108 1.000 -0.246 -0.347 
13.RD 0.003 -0.013 0.228 0.081 0.063 0.233 -0.177 -0.099 0.078 -0.363 0.248 -0.276 1.000 0.305 
14.ADV -0.060 -0.050 0.036 0.025 0.011 0.075 -0.166 -0.067 0.010 -0.187 0.150 -0.315 0.301 1.000 
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Table 4 Academic Directors and CSR Reporting (Test of H1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample Full sample PSM sample PSM sample 
Dependent Variable CSR ASSURE CSR ASSURE 
DIR_ACAD 0.021** 0.021*** 0.030* 0.017* 
 (2.24) (2.78) (1.74) (1.73) 
ATO 0.027* 0.017** 0.046** 0.022* 
 (1.69) (2.24) (2.32) (1.65) 
PM -0.016 -0.028* -0.020 -0.017 
 (-0.63) (-1.95) (-0.53) (-0.73) 
CFO -0.013 -0.018 -0.033 -0.038 
 (-0.42) (-0.89) (-0.69) (-1.07) 
LEV 0.012 0.020 -0.008 0.001 
 (0.36) (1.18) (-0.20) (0.03) 
MTB 0.006 -0.000 0.013* -0.002 
 (1.22) (-0.03) (1.75) (-0.34) 
SIZE 0.050*** 0.020*** 0.063*** 0.020** 
 (4.09) (3.17) (3.65) (2.24) 
RD 0.856*** 0.301** 1.324*** 0.352* 
 (3.15) (2.02) (3.39) (1.86) 
ADV 0.110 -0.030 0.269 0.057 
 (0.57) (-0.30) (1.11) (0.56) 
BDIND 0.029** 0.013 -0.017 0.006 
 (2.31) (1.51) (-0.94) (0.52) 
Constant -0.497** -0.394*** -1.239*** -0.434*** 
 (-2.23) (-3.53) (-4.18) (-2.79) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect No No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,924 13,924 6,960 6,960 
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.370 0.582 0.445 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively in a two-tailed test. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 5 Academic Director Industry/Accounting Expertise and CSR Reporting (Test of H2a and H2b) 
Panel A: Full sample         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Full sample Full sample PSM sample PSM sample Full sample Full sample PSM sample PSM sample 
Dependent Variable CSR ASSURE CSR ASSURE CSR ASSURE CSR ASSURE 
ACAD_IND 0.013 0.019*** 0.026* 0.030***     
 (1.36) (2.64) (1.90) (3.09)     
ACAD_ACCT     0.015 0.018 0.030 0.025* 
     (0.87) (1.42) (1.40) (1.74) 
DIR_ACAD 0.042*** 0.026*** 0.000 0.011* 0.043*** 0.028*** 0.012 0.017*** 
 (3.01) (2.96) (0.01) (1.78) (3.14) (3.16) (0.97) (2.61) 
ATO 0.025 0.006 0.001 -0.000 0.025 0.006 0.012 0.004 
 (1.62) (1.34) (0.07) (-0.01) (1.61) (1.30) (1.42) (0.86) 
PM -0.016 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001** -0.016 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001** 
 (-0.62) (-0.04) (-0.76) (-2.19) (-0.63) (-0.01) (-1.01) (-2.17) 
CFO -0.013 -0.028 0.033 0.005 -0.012 -0.028 0.089 0.024 
 (-0.42) (-1.30) (0.63) (0.18) (-0.42) (-1.29) (1.60) (0.87) 
LEV 0.013 0.021 -0.082** -0.022 0.013 0.021 -0.081** -0.021 
 (0.39) (1.49) (-2.44) (-1.32) (0.39) (1.48) (-2.41) (-1.25) 
MTB 0.006 0.000 0.004** 0.002** 0.006 0.000 0.004** 0.002** 
 (1.28) (0.09) (2.23) (2.40) (1.30) (0.14) (2.31) (2.43) 
SIZE 0.050*** 0.019*** 0.079*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.019*** 0.078*** 0.043*** 
 (4.08) (3.60) (13.16) (9.42) (4.08) (3.61) (12.73) (9.30) 
RD 0.839*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.002** 0.835*** 0.000 -0.002 -0.002** 
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 (3.09) (0.71) (-0.56) (-2.23) (3.07) (0.76) (-0.84) (-2.21) 
ADV 0.107 -0.005 -0.004 0.007 0.108 -0.005 -0.004 0.007 
 (0.56) (-0.63) (-0.33) (1.30) (0.56) (-0.71) (-0.31) (1.27) 
BDIND 0.018 0.006 0.053*** 0.021*** 0.018 0.006 0.024* 0.012 
 (1.42) (0.71) (4.17) (3.09) (1.43) (0.73) (1.88) (1.61) 
Constant -0.491** -0.395*** -1.129*** -0.645*** -0.492** -0.395*** -1.188*** -0.668*** 
 (-2.20) (-3.97) (-12.84) (-9.42) (-2.20) (-3.97) (-12.85) (-9.32) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Industry fixed effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,924 13,924 6,960 6,960 13,924 13,924 6,960 6,960 
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.372 0.121 0.102 0.480 0.371 0.148 0.109 
 
Panel B: Sample with academic directors (DIR_ACAD=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Dependent Variable CSR ASSURE CSR ASSURE   
ACAD_IND 0.019* 0.022***     
 (1.85) (2.63)     
ACAD_ACCT   0.022 0.029*   
   (1.09) (1.73)   
ATO 0.048 0.040 0.047 0.039   
 (1.42) (1.42) (1.39) (1.38)   
PM -0.007 -0.005 -0.009 -0.007   
 (-0.11) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.16)   
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CFO -0.063 -0.084 -0.061 -0.082   
 (-0.87) (-1.40) (-0.86) (-1.37)   
LEV -0.026 -0.026 -0.025 -0.025   
 (-0.39) (-0.49) (-0.38) (-0.46)   
MTB 0.015 0.002 0.015 0.002   
 (1.45) (0.18) (1.47) (0.22)   
SIZE 0.050* 0.003 0.050* 0.003   
 (1.78) (0.21) (1.77) (0.21)   
RD 1.765*** 0.564** 1.749*** 0.548**   
 (3.16) (2.13) (3.13) (2.09)   
ADV 0.433 -0.019 0.439 -0.013   
 (0.98) (-0.12) (0.99) (-0.09)   
BDIND 0.010 0.017 0.011 0.017   
 (0.19) (0.40) (0.20) (0.41)   
Constant -1.044** -0.160 -1.043** -0.160   
 (-2.10) (-0.65) (-2.09) (-0.65)   
Frim fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Observations 3,505 3,505 3,505 3,505   
Adjusted R2 0.663 0.528 0.662 0.527   
 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in a two-tailed test. See the Appendix for 
variable definitions. 
 
  
44 
 
Table 6 Robustness Tests—Controlling for CSR Performance  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable CSR ASSURE CSR ASSURE CSR ASSURE 
DIR_ACAD 0.021** 0.021*** 0.037*** 0.023*** 0.038*** 0.025*** 
 (2.17) (2.81) (2.79) (2.72) (2.91) (2.92) 
ACAD_IND   0.013 0.020***   
   (1.41) (2.76)   
ACAD_ACCT     0.019 0.020* 
     (1.15) (1.70) 
ATO 0.018 0.015** 0.023 0.005 0.023 0.005 
 (1.57) (2.17) (1.50) (1.33) (1.49) (1.29) 
PM -0.001 -0.027* -0.014 -0.000 -0.014 -0.000 
 (-0.08) (-1.91) (-0.55) (-0.10) (-0.56) (-0.07) 
CFO -0.009 -0.019 -0.013 -0.027 -0.013 -0.027 
 (-0.37) (-0.92) (-0.46) (-1.28) (-0.45) (-1.27) 
LEV 0.012 0.018 0.009 0.020 0.009 0.020 
 (0.41) (1.10) (0.29) (1.44) (0.29) (1.44) 
MTB 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 
 (0.92) (0.05) (1.39) (0.09) (1.41) (0.15) 
SIZE 0.045*** 0.018*** 0.047*** 0.017*** 0.047*** 0.017*** 
 (4.21) (2.96) (4.00) (3.36) (4.00) (3.36) 
RD 0.247** 0.269* 0.789*** 0.000 0.785*** 0.000 
 (2.40) (1.84) (2.94) (0.75) (2.93) (0.80) 
ADV 0.091 -0.034 0.101 -0.005 0.102 -0.006 
45 
 
 (0.81) (-0.34) (0.56) (-0.70) (0.57) (-0.78) 
BDIND 0.023* 0.009 0.013 0.002 0.013 0.003 
 (1.87) (1.01) (1.03) (0.29) (1.04) (0.31) 
CSRPERF 0.332*** 0.208*** 0.329*** 0.205*** 0.329*** 0.206*** 
 (6.13) (4.30) (6.10) (4.26) (6.11) (4.26) 
Constant -0.416** -0.358*** -0.434** -0.357*** -0.435** -0.357*** 
 (-2.08) (-3.27) (-2.02) (-3.68) (-2.03) (-3.68) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,924 13,924 13,924 13,924 13,924 13,924 
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.383 0.545 0.449 0.545 0.449 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in a two-tailed test. See the Appendix for 
variable definitions. 
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Table 7 Presence of Accounting Faculty Director and CSR Reporting  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable CSR ASSURE CSR ASSURE 
DIR_ACAD_ACC 0.055** 0.043* 0.045** 0.038* 
 (2.36) (1.92) (2.13) (1.73) 
ATO 0.026* 0.017** 0.017 0.015** 
 (1.67) (2.19) (1.55) (2.14) 
PM -0.017 -0.029** -0.001 -0.027* 
 (-0.66) (-1.99) (-0.11) (-1.94) 
CFO -0.013 -0.018 -0.009 -0.019 
 (-0.44) (-0.91) (-0.38) (-0.94) 
LEV 0.012 0.020 0.012 0.018 
 (0.36) (1.18) (0.41) (1.09) 
MTB 0.006 -0.000 0.003 0.000 
 (1.21) (-0.04) (0.89) (0.05) 
SIZE 0.050*** 0.019*** 0.044*** 0.018*** 
 (4.13) (3.14) (4.23) (2.93) 
RD 0.831*** 0.280* 0.234** 0.249* 
 (3.06) (1.88) (2.27) (1.71) 
ADV 0.105 -0.034 0.090 -0.037 
 (0.55) (-0.33) (0.81) (-0.36) 
BDIND 0.029** 0.013 0.022* 0.009 
 (2.25) (1.51) (1.85) (1.03) 
CSRPERF   0.330*** 0.206*** 
   (6.07) (4.25) 
Constant -0.492** -0.390*** -0.411** -0.354*** 
 (-2.24) (-3.49) (-2.08) (-3.23) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,924 13,924 13,924 13,924 
Adjusted R2 0.479 0.370 0.490 0.383 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively in a two-tailed test. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 8 Cross-sectional Analysis: The Moderating Effect of Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Low-growth High-growth Low-growth High-growth Low-growth High-growth Low-growth High-growth 
Dependent Variable CSR CSR ASSURE ASSURE CSR CSR ASSURE ASSURE 
DIR_ACAD 0.005 0.031* 0.003 0.042*** 0.008 0.060*** 0.007*** 0.045*** 
 (0.76) (1.67) (1.07) (2.93) (1.19) (3.37) (2.89) (3.27) 
ACAD_IND     0.004 0.025 0.001 0.049*** 
     (0.57) (1.25) (0.48) (3.18) 
ATO -0.001 0.063*** 0.000 0.028 -0.002 0.077*** 0.000 0.047** 
 (-0.13) (2.78) (0.11) (1.58) (-0.20) (2.66) (0.05) (2.11) 
PM 0.008 -0.164** 0.000 -0.083 0.017 -0.203** 0.001 -0.188*** 
 (1.12) (-2.44) (0.07) (-1.59) (1.11) (-2.36) (0.12) (-2.82) 
CFO -0.000 -0.094 -0.005 -0.075 -0.007 -0.121 -0.008 -0.083 
 (-0.02) (-1.35) (-0.67) (-1.39) (-0.28) (-1.53) (-0.96) (-1.35) 
LEV -0.010 0.152** 0.006 0.122** -0.019 0.177** 0.006 0.141** 
 (-0.65) (2.17) (1.03) (2.23) (-1.18) (2.46) (1.00) (2.54) 
MTB 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.014* 0.001 0.005 
 (0.74) (0.62) (0.71) (0.02) (0.89) (1.70) (1.35) (0.73) 
SIZE 0.019*** 0.025 0.003 0.030* 0.028*** 0.013 0.004 0.018 
 (3.53) (1.27) (1.30) (1.96) (4.41) (0.63) (1.57) (1.16) 
RD 0.046 1.003** 0.000 1.289*** 0.034 2.302*** 0.012 1.975*** 
 (0.89) (2.00) (0.01) (3.30) (0.29) (3.08) (0.29) (3.40) 
ADV 0.022 0.097 -0.008 -0.401* 0.071 0.883** -0.028 0.031 
 (0.47) (0.36) (-0.45) (-1.94) (0.84) (2.26) (-0.90) (0.10) 
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BDIND 0.011 0.077*** 0.005** 0.030** 0.010 0.056*** 0.004 0.016 
 (1.59) (4.76) (2.03) (2.42) (1.37) (3.32) (1.44) (1.21) 
Constant -0.364*** -0.180 -0.056 -0.687** -0.529*** 0.040 -0.082* -0.455 
 (-3.43) (-0.48) (-1.45) (-2.34) (-4.33) (0.11) (-1.83) (-1.56) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,772 4,511 4,772 4,511 4,772 4,511 4,772 4,511 
Adjusted R2 0.511 0.528 0.305 0.410 0.512 0.530 0.307 0.413 
We divided the sample into tercile based on the value of sales growth rate. High-growth (low-growth) sample refers to firms in the top (bottom) tercile. Robust t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in a two-tailed test. See the Appendix for variable definitions.  
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Table 9 Cross-sectional Analysis: The Moderating Effect of Institutional Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Low-
ownership 
High-
ownership 
Low-
ownership 
High-
ownership 
Low-
ownership 
High-
ownership 
Low-
ownership 
High-
ownership 
Dependent Variable CSR CSR ASSURE ASSURE CSR CSR ASSURE ASSURE 
DIR_ACAD 0.016 0.070** 0.013 0.036* 0.014 0.064*** 0.012 0.028** 
 (0.96) (2.26) (1.34) (1.65) (1.46) (3.89) (1.27) (2.28) 
ACAD_IND     0.010 0.033* 0.005 0.044*** 
     (0.94) (1.76) (0.78) (3.11) 
ATO 0.023 0.018 -0.006 0.034 0.023* 0.016 -0.006 0.032* 
 (1.25) (0.46) (-0.90) (1.30) (1.85) (0.65) (-0.89) (1.70) 
PM 0.021 -0.007 0.017 -0.061 0.021 -0.005 0.017 -0.059 
 (0.60) (-0.09) (1.47) (-1.30) (0.77) (-0.09) (1.48) (-1.33) 
CFO -0.030 -0.037 -0.019 -0.029 -0.030 -0.036 -0.019 -0.028 
 (-0.94) (-0.43) (-1.25) (-0.43) (-0.84) (-0.50) (-1.23) (-0.51) 
LEV -0.014 0.136 0.013 0.085 -0.014 0.137** 0.013 0.086** 
 (-0.43) (1.60) (0.85) (1.51) (-0.54) (2.38) (0.85) (1.98) 
MTB 0.001 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.019*** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.31) (1.57) (0.44) (0.06) (0.33) (2.62) (0.44) (0.07) 
SIZE 0.020* 0.023 0.009 0.016 0.020** 0.022 0.009 0.015 
 (1.71) (0.75) (1.22) (0.78) (2.28) (1.31) (1.22) (1.20) 
RD 0.754** 0.721 0.153 0.514 0.756*** 0.719 0.154 0.511 
 (2.15) (0.77) (1.61) (0.96) (3.57) (1.41) (1.62) (1.33) 
ADV 0.048 0.359 -0.006 0.113 0.046 0.359 -0.007 0.112 
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 (0.22) (0.81) (-0.05) (0.42) (0.31) (1.12) (-0.06) (0.46) 
BDIND 0.044** -0.016 0.010 -0.002 0.044*** -0.017 0.010 -0.003 
 (2.03) (-0.57) (1.01) (-0.08) (4.69) (-1.00) (1.00) (-0.20) 
Constant -0.354* -0.253 -0.162 -0.378 -0.355** -0.250 -0.163 -0.374 
 (-1.86) (-0.46) (-1.27) (-1.04) (-2.37) (-0.77) (-1.27) (-1.53) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,773 4,510 4,773 4,510 4,773 4,510 4,773 4,510 
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.520 0.286 0.371 0.393 0.520 0.286 0.373 
We divided the sample into tercile based on the value of institutional ownership. High-ownership (low-ownership) sample refers to firms in the top (bottom) tercile. Robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively in a two-tailed test. See the Appendix for variable 
definitions.  
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Table 10 Cross-sectional Analysis: The Moderating Effect of Control-Ownership Divergence  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Low-
divergence 
High-
divergence 
Low-
divergence 
High-
divergence 
Low-
divergence 
High-
divergence 
Low-
divergence 
High-
divergence 
Dependent Variable CSR CSR ASSURE ASSURE CSR CSR ASSURE ASSURE 
DIR_ACAD 0.033 0.065** 0.011 0.036 0.032 0.062*** 0.007 0.033*** 
 (1.45) (2.47) (0.80) (1.47) (1.33) (4.08) (0.50) (3.21) 
ACAD_IND     0.007 0.019 0.018 0.018* 
     (0.35) (1.24) (1.15) (1.72) 
ATO -0.010 0.067*** 0.001 0.002 -0.010 0.067*** 0.001 0.002 
 (-0.68) (2.69) (0.07) (0.14) (-0.67) (3.55) (0.09) (0.18) 
PM -0.014 0.039 -0.012 -0.004 -0.014 0.039 -0.012 -0.005 
 (-0.82) (1.14) (-1.27) (-0.28) (-0.82) (1.19) (-1.27) (-0.23) 
CFO 0.015 -0.059 -0.022 -0.017 0.015 -0.059 -0.022 -0.017 
 (0.42) (-1.22) (-1.15) (-0.68) (0.41) (-1.16) (-1.17) (-0.50) 
LEV -0.001 0.027 -0.009 0.013 -0.001 0.027 -0.009 0.013 
 (-0.02) (0.37) (-0.45) (0.33) (-0.02) (0.55) (-0.45) (0.40) 
MTB 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.004 
 (0.90) (-0.12) (0.50) (0.70) (0.90) (-0.22) (0.49) (1.16) 
SIZE 0.020 0.050* 0.009 0.020 0.020 0.051*** 0.009 0.020* 
 (1.14) (1.80) (1.45) (1.21) (1.14) (3.26) (1.45) (1.91) 
RD 0.127 0.536* 0.039 -0.020 0.128 0.541** 0.041 -0.014 
 (1.30) (1.76) (0.72) (-0.16) (1.30) (2.57) (0.78) (-0.10) 
ADV -0.265 0.295 -0.210 -0.005 -0.267* 0.290* -0.215 -0.010 
52 
 
 (-1.64) (1.11) (-1.17) (-0.07) (-1.65) (1.66) (-1.20) (-0.08) 
BDIND 0.057** 0.061** 0.012 0.011 0.056** 0.061*** 0.012 0.011 
 (2.50) (2.06) (0.87) (0.56) (2.49) (3.79) (0.84) (1.00) 
Constant -0.358 -0.568 -0.162 -0.410 -0.358 -0.576* -0.162 -0.418** 
 (-1.25) (-1.10) (-1.46) (-1.37) (-1.25) (-1.95) (-1.47) (-2.07) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,023 4,247 5,023 4,247 5,023 4,247 5,023 4,247 
Adjusted R2 0.498 0.539 0.322 0.413 0.498 0.539 0.322 0.413 
We divided the sample into tercile based on the value of control-ownership divergence, measured by one minus the cash flow rights divided by the voting rights. High-
divergence (low-divergence) sample refers to firms in the top (bottom) tercile. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively in a two-tailed test. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
